Chad’s evolving foreign policy under President Mahamat Déby is reshaping its long-standing alliances, as the country deepens its relationship with Russia while continuing to engage with its traditional Western partners, particularly France and the United States. This balancing act comes at a time of increasing anti-Western sentiment across parts of Africa, where Russia has gained influence, especially in the Sahel region, challenging the presence of Western powers.
Chad’s overtures to Russia are significant. President Déby’s January meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, followed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Chad in June, signals a growing partnership. Although discussions have primarily focused on cultural and media exchanges—evidenced by the opening of a Russian cultural center in N’Djamena—there are hints of potential military cooperation. This has alarmed both France and the U.S., who fear that Chad, a strategic ally in Africa, could tilt toward Moscow’s sphere of influence.
Russia’s use of cultural diplomacy and information tools, such as social media, has already proved effective in West African countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These nations, led by military regimes, have expelled Western forces and developed military ties with Moscow, attracted by Russia’s non-interference stance on governance issues. Chad, with its strategic position and historical ties to France and the U.S., represents an important geopolitical prize that Western powers are keen to maintain within their orbit.
Chad’s new relationship with Russia is particularly troubling for France, which has a military base in N’Djamena and smaller garrisons in other parts of the country. After the setbacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—where Paris was forced to withdraw troops helping in the fight against jihadist groups—the prospect of losing influence in Chad would be another blow. The U.S. also has vested interests, though its small detachment of special forces was temporarily asked to leave by Déby ahead of Chad’s May 2024 election. However, they have since returned, underscoring Washington’s desire to maintain its strategic foothold.
Chad occupies a critical position in Africa, bordered by volatile countries like Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic (CAR). The ongoing civil war in Sudan, the instability in Libya, and the conflict in CAR make Chad a key player in regional security dynamics. The country serves as a conduit for arms flowing into Sudan and remains strategically vital to both Western and Russian interests. The involvement of the Russian paramilitary group, formerly known as Wagner (now Africa Corps), in neighboring conflicts highlights Russia’s military footprint in the region.
President Déby has shown that he understands Chad’s strategic importance and is using it to leverage relations with both Russia and the West. His decision to run in the May election, despite African Union rules against transitional military leaders running for office, drew private concern from France but no public rebuke, reflecting how crucial Chad is to Paris. Similarly, Déby’s dissatisfaction with the U.S. backing of his election opponent and the judicial probes into Chadian elites’ assets in France has caused friction, but not to the point of breaking relations.
Chad’s relationship with Russia appears to be a strategic move by Déby to gain more autonomy and influence in negotiations with traditional Western allies. However, it is unlikely that Chad will completely shift its allegiance away from France and the U.S., given its long-standing partnerships and the strategic benefits these relationships provide. Déby seems content to play off Russia and the West, ensuring that Chad remains a critical player in both regional and international affairs.